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There are trial practitioners who would tell you that compara-
tive negligence law in North Dakota is nothing new. That as a
practical matter, juries have been comparing negligence for years.
They rationalize that juries find for a given party and then miti-
gate the recovery by a comparison of the parties' respective negli-
gence. Be that as it may, it was not until the 1973 Legislature
adopted North Dakota Century Code § 9-10-07, effective July 1, 1973,
that it could be said that North Dakota has a comparative negli-
gence law:
§ 9-10-07. Comparative Negligence.-Contrilbutory negli-
gence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages for negli-
gence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of
the person against whom recovery is sought, but any dam-
ages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering. The court
may, and when requested by either party shall, direct the
jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount
of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable
to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering. When
there are two or more persons who are jointly liable, con-
tributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percent-
age of negligence attributable to each; provided, however,
that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the
whole award. Upon the request of any party, this section
shall be read by the court to the jury and the attorneys
representing the parties may comment to the jury regard-
ing this section.
As § 9-10-07 now exists, it is not unlike most other new statutes
which bring about substantial change.' It may well have some pro-
* Tenneson, Serkland, Lundberg & Erickson, Ltd., Fargo, N. D., J.D., 1958, Univer-
sity of North Dakota.
1. As North Dakota practitioners consider the application of the law, we might note
some resource materials. Besides the general encyclopedias, Wisconsin's comparative negli-
gence statute which has been in effect for many years and cases arising thereunder are
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visions which need to be amplified, amended or construed. There-
fore, it may take some time, some trials, appeals, amendments-
and maybe some inequities enroute-before we have what most would
consider a workable comparative negligence statute.
Through the years we have become accustomed to thinking that
contributory negligence and other affirmative defenses such as as-
sumption of risk are a complete bar to a plaintiff's claim. Now,
these affirmative defenses are reflected in percentages of negligence
which determine if in fact the moving party is entitled to recover
and, if so, what amount.
It is significant to note that the language of our law reflects
that if plaintiff's negligence was not as great as the negligence of
the defendant then there shall be recovery. Therefore, in a case in-
volving one plaintiff and one defendant, the plaintiff will recover if
he is less than 50 percent negligent.
There are two basic forms of comparative negligence. The one
North Dakota has adopted is very close to the one which is com-
monly referred to as the modified form of comparative negligence.
Under the modified form the plaintiff will not recover anything un-
less his liability is less than a certain percentage of liability. The
other form is what is referred to as the pure comparative negli-
gence and is only present in the state of Mississippi. 2 The pure
form provides that, although the plaintiff may be more than fifty
percent negligent, this does not bar him from recovering that per-
cent of damages not attributed to his negligence. In 'other words, if
plaintiff's damages are ascertained at $10,000 and he is eighty
percent negligent, he still recovers twenty percent, or $2,000; if he
is ninety-n-ine percent negligent, he still recovers one percent, or
$100.
II. COMPARISON WITH OTHER STATES
This article is intended merely to be a discussion of various
aspects of the new comparative negligence law as it relates to other
laws and the anticipated application of the law in North Dakota
found in Volume 40K Wis. STAT. ANN. Attorneya and fellow practitioners Carroll
and James Heft have a one-volume manual on comparative negligence, entitled CoMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1971) which we will refer to later in the article. The thoughts
expressed herein are derived from various readings, seminars, lectures and trial experience,
the total of which makes it difficult to properly give credit by way of footnotes or sources,
but we have tried to give credit as best we can.
2. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972):
Contributory negligence no bar to recovery of damages-jury may diminish
damages. In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where
such Injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that
the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having control
over the property may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by -the jury in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured, or the owner
of the property, or the person having control over the property.
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drawn from experiences under similar statutes. We will raise ques-
tions which will need to be resolved either by judicial interpretation
or statutory change.
Comparative negligence is a significant change in North Dakota
law. The proponents of comparative negligence assert that there
is reason for dissatisfaction with the present system of handling
tort cases. They point to the manner in which litigation is delayed
and claim that the practicing bar and insurance carriers have not
adequately taken care of the accident victim; thus, a change in tort
reparations is called for through comparative negligence. Some also
claim that too many benefits run to the defendant and too few to the
injured plaintiff.
Comparative negligence is generally opposed by insurance car-
riers and defense lawyers. On the other hand, it is generally favored
by plaintiffs' attorneys. In addition legal writers and scholars are
almost unanimous in a desire to remove the bar of contributory ne-
gligence.3
At the legislative session that brought us our comparative ne-
gligence statute, there was support for the pure form of compara-
tive negligence and the question may be raised as to why we did
not adopt a pure form. The answer could well be that someday
we will, but to go from a system in which something more than
slight contributory negligence was a complete bar to a situation
where someone who is 95 percent negligent can recover 5 per-
cent of his loss would be too much of a transition. It is more logi-
cal that the transition be gradual.
Wisconsin has solved its tort litigation for more than forty years
through the application of comparative negligence. Through these
years, the law has changed, and it continues to change as the elec-
torate imposes society's needs and wants upon its legislative body.
As we will cover in more detail later, it is interesting to note that
when Minnesota adopted its comparative negligence law in 1969,1
Wisconsin was operating under the same test adopted by Minnesota,
and now by North Dakota, that being the "not as great as" test.
In 1969, New Hampshire passed a comparative negligence law which
permitted recovery provided plaintiff's negligence "was not greater
3. A fine example of a scholar favoring removal of contributory negligence as a bar
is Prosser in W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 433 (4th ed. 1971).
In that the hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the
plaintiff is readily apparent, it places upon one party the entire burden of a
loss for which two are by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the de-
fendant has placed no less a part in causing the damage; the plaintiff's devia-
tion from the community standard may even be more extreme; the injured
man is in all probability for the very reason, of his Injury the less able to
bear the financial burden of the law; and the answer of the law to all this
Is that the defendant goes scott free of all liability and the plaintiff bears it all.
4. MINN. STATS. ANN. § 604.01 (1974 Supp.).
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than" defendant's negligence.5 In 1971, Wisconsin amended its law
to conform with the New Hampshire test.'
The significant difference in our law and the Wisconsin-New
Hampshire type statute is that in the latter if the jury determines
the negligence of plaintiff and defendant to be evenly balanced,
fifty percent each, then there is recovery of fifty percent; where-
as under the Minnesota-North Dakota form, plaintiff would not re-
cover with a fifty-fifty finding-North Dakota's standard being "not
as great as." There have been those on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court who expressed the thought that Wisconsin should now amend
its law to a pure form.
7
Heft, in his treatise, concludes, and it seems well taken, that
if you are to consider fault doctrines at all, it seems as though
pure comparative negligence is wrong.8 The pure form goes too
far and is too liberal; it is not in line with the adversary system
as it tends to compensate tortfeasors who are essentially guilty of
causing the occurrence. It would seem that the pure form is quite
similar to a no-fault type statute and maybe we are in a transition
process, enroute to the no-fault system." However, as we understand
most no-fault plans, they are very limited in application, so com-
parative negligence would remain the rule in the cases not specifi.-
cally covered by the no-fault legislation.
In 1955 Arkansas adopted a system which was intended to
permit a plaintiff to recover though his negligence was greater
than the defendant's. However, due to confusing results the statute
was repealed two years later by enactments which allowed recovery
only when the plaintiff's negligence was less than the defendant's. 0
Our neighbors, Nebraska and South Dakota, permit the plain-
tiff to recover if his negligence is slight in comparison to the de-
fendant's gross negligence, but state that the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in mitigation of
the plaintiff's damages. 1 The questions of negligence and contributory
negligence are for the jury.12 It is quite obvious that this is a general
5. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7 (a) (Supp. 1973).
6. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966).
7. Lawyer v. City of Park Falls, -Wise.-, 151 N.W.2d 68 (1967). Justice Hal-
lows not only wrote the basic opinion but also wrote a concurring opinion in which he
stated :
In justice, there is no reason why a plaintiff who is 52 percent negligent
should not recover 58 percent of the amount of his damage. There Is nothing
magic about being equally at fault so that one should lose all and the other
win all. Each tort-feasor should be responsible for his torts to the extent of
his culpability, whether that be less than or more than 50 percent of the
total; and conversely, each tort-feasor should be able to recover the amount
of his damages caused by himself and another diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to him.
8. C. HEFT & J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1971).
9. In House Bill 1214, The North Dakota Legislaturue adopted a "No Fault Plan".
10. C. HEFT & J. HEFT, supra note 8. at § 390.
11. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25.1151 (1964) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967).
12. Id.
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verdict system, and that the jury is, in those states, permitted to
determine the end result or award without any percentage find-
ing. This would seem to make it difficult for any possible court
supervision of that verdict. It is submitted that the South Dakota-
Nebraska statute is not ideal, since what might be slight or gross
negligence in the minds of one jury is not necessarily slight or
gross negligence in the minds of another. It seems more logical that
percentages or ordinary negligence would be a better method when
you are weighing the relative negligence of the parties.
Prior to 1974, twenty-one states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Is-
lands had adopted comparative negligence. 13 If numbers and experi-
ence mean anything, it would seem that the Minnesota, Wisconsin
and North Dakota forms-"not as great as," or "not greater than"
-are the more popular and better methods because they provide
a truer comparison of negligence while leaving the adversary sy-
stem intact.
III. FEATURES OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LAW
A. Application of the Statute
In light of what we have discussed and considering other appli-
cable laws, what does North Dakota have in its new comparative
negligence statute? In such a review we must note some of the
things the Legislature did or did not do at the time of adopting
the comparative negligence doctrine:
1. It restated our degrees of negligence as slight, or-
dinary and gross.
14
2. It did not repeal the guest statute.1 5
3. It did not specifically provide that the law should
be applied retroactively, but rather the law received the
standard effective application date of July 1, 1973.
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. 27-1730.1-1730.2 (1947) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-557d (1958) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968) (modified-plaintiff may
recover even though plaintiff may in some way have contributed to hiq injury) ; V-AWAYI
REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 6-801-6 (1947); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tits. 14, § 156 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAws Ch. 231, § 85 (Supp. 1975) ; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.01 (1975) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-19 (1972) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964);
NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. 787 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7 (Supp. 1973); N.J. REV.
STAT. Title 2A, c-15, § 5.1 (Supp. 1975) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1971) ; OK!.A.
23 § 11 (1975) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1973) ; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1974) ;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (1956) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 20-9-2 (1967) Tex.
Vernons Tex. Stat., house bill, 88 63rd Legislature; VT. STAT. ANN. 12-1036 (1972) V.!.
CODE ANN. 5-1451; Wash. First Exec. Session, c. 138, effective 4/1/74; WisC. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (1966).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-16 (1975) "Degrees of negligence.-There are three degrees
of negligence mentioned in this code, namely, slight, ordinary, and gross. Each of the
last two include any lesser degree or degrees."
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-03 (1972), which was held to be unconstitutional. John-
son v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974), noted in 50 N.D.L. REv. 139 (1973).
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At first blush, and noting our discussion of South Dakota and
Nebraska statutes which involve a comparison between slight and
gross negligence, we might think that such was being considered in
North Dakota; however, our statute has no such language.
It would be useful, as we discuss and attempt to apply com-
parative negligence, if we would set up a hypothetical case to use
as a means of showing actual application of the doctrine. This
hypothetical case will be referred to throughout this article. Let
us assume the following facts:
A is the driver of an automobile owned by B, who is a pas-
senger in the right front seat. The car is involved in an inter-
section accident with a car owned and driven by C. It is a
clear day, road conditions are good and unobstructed, and the
road upon which C is driving is the favored roadway, not
only by a yield sign, but by C having the directional right of
way. However, C was driving at a rate of speed which
bordered on the limit and the normal lookout questions were
present. All parties were injured. A and B commenced a
suit against C who in turn counter-claimed against A and B
for his injuries and damages.
From experience, one might surmise, that this is the type of
case where, under the contributory negligence rule, C is, more often
than not, found to be contributorily negligent and barred from re-
covery. A may well be found by the jury to be negligent as a mat-
ter of law or quickly dismissed by the jury. B would normally re-
cover unless, by circumstances, A's negligence is imputed to B as
owner, or barred by an affirmative defense.
It should be noted that comparative negligence in no way changes
the substantive law, but rather changes the determination of those
substantive rights or duties into percentages of negligence to deter-
mine the right to recovery. It will be noted later that comparative
negligence, while not changing the substantive law, can make quite
a difference in the way pleadings are structured.
B. Effective Date
The effective date of our statute, July 1, 1973, raises a ques-
tion as to the practical application of the law. North Dakota Cen-
tury Code section 1-02-10 provides:
No part of this code is retroactive unless it is expressly
declared to be so.
As noted, our present law is silent and, therefore, it appears that
comparative negligence will be applied only to causes of action
occurring and accruing after July 1, 1973. It would seem from
the practical application of the law by the courts that this is going
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to create some problems and concerns. To illustrate, let us take
our hypothetical fact situation, but with one accident occurring be-
fore July 1, 1973, and one after July 1, 1973. The cases are tried
back-to-back before the same jury. Let us assume that C is found
to be negligent in failure to keep a proper lookout, but not as
to his rate of speed. Let us say that he is twenty percent and that
this is more than slight,16 and, therefore, he is barred from recovery
by the law of contributory negligence.
In the second suit, where the accident occurred after July 1,
C is not only found to be negligent as a result of a failure to keep a
lookout, but also as to his speed, and his negligence accumulates to
a total of forty-five percent. He then goes home with fifty-five percent
of the total damages. It seems to this writer that it would be of little
consolation to C, in case one, that the law changed the week after
he had his accident; and, therefore, he is completely barred. Granted,
laws must have an effective date and change at some time or
another, but it would appear that the Legislature thought that society,
at that given point in time, had concluded that people should
be compensated if their negligence was not as great as the other
party's. The reasons for concluding that contributory negligence
should no longer be a bar to recovery were to take away or allevi-
ate the harshness of that doctrine. In addition, it would seem that
it would be confusing to the jury to reconcile why one day they
are not compensating and the next day they are compensating un-
der the same set of facts.
There are good arguments for not applying the law retroactive-
ly. To do so would mean that cases which occurred prior to July
1, 1973, may have a significant value following July 1, 1973, be-
cause after that date contributory negligence would no longer be a
complete bar to recovery. This was evident in Minnesota follow-
ing its application of comparative negligence in that a great num-
ber of subrogation claims were dug out of the cellars and re-
evaluated as if the statute of limitations had not run on them. These
cases received a value if there was ten or fifteen percent negligence
(assuming that the figure may be considered as contributory negli-
gence). It boils down to the mere fact that they could recover
that portion of their interest in the subrogation matter up to the
percentage which they themselves were not negligent. If we are
to conclude that comparative negligence was enacted because con-
tributory negligence was too harsh a doctrine, then it should not
be incongruous with society's desires that we do consider compen-
16. In Willert v. Nielsen, 146 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1966) the North Dakota Supreme Court
held it prejudicial error to Instruct that plaintiff's contributory negligence, "even in the
slightest degree", would bar recovery.
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sating on a comparative negligence basis those persons whose mat-
ters had not already been litigated and in which the statute of
limitations had not run. In those cases, a general philosophy is
that it is better to spread the losses over the great masses than
to have an individual suffer the loss acknowledging that in most
cases the losses are paid through insurance carriers and then
spread over the multitude of policyholders.
As noted above, Minnesota did provide that its law would be
applied to all cases tried after July 1, 1969, and as one might sus-
pect it quickly was tested on constitutional grounds. 1 7 The Minn-
esota Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had intended to
give, and had the constitutional right to give, the statute retrospective
application.
C. Guest Statute
Since the 1973 Legislature restated and readopted the degrees
of negligence and did not remove the guest statute, it seems ap.
parent that the legislature still wanted to favor a host driver.18
Still, when considered logically, it was inconsistent to enact a com-
parative negligence law and retain the guest statute, which requires
proof of gross negligence. The jury would be asked to compare two
dissimilar degrees of negligence in its deliberations. The theory of
comparative negligence is that the respective negligence of all part-
ies involved is compared in order to determine whether the plain-
tiff shall recover.
Guest statutes are not favored in the tort system; many have
been repealed and not one has been enacted in the past 25 years.
Guest statutes have as their only justification the ruling out of col-
lusive lawsuits.
North Dakota has ruled its guest statute unconstitutional. " While
the decision comes following the passage of our comparative negli-
gence law, the supreme court used that as only one of the reasons
why it should be struck down. However, it is timely that the guest
statute was set aside at the onset of practice under comparative ne-
gligence in order to permit a more smooth and logical operation
of the statute's purpose.
We believe that the setting aside of the guest statute is a re-
lief to many persons dealing with the statute. In the waning days
of the guest statute, many practitioners approached one-car guest
17. Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, -Minn.-, 173 N.W.2d 853 (1969). In this
case there was involved an action for personal injury occurring on April 24, 1967, more
than two years before the statute's enactment. The court acknowledged that there are
cases contrary, but concluded the better rule would be a retrospective application.
18. See Case Comment, 50 N.D.L. REv. 139 (1973) for discussion of guest statute in
North Dakota.
19. Johnson v. -assett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
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negligence on the premise that juries have little difficulty find-
ing gross negligence in order to compensate; that the doctrine or
statute had become watered down and in many cases, some will
contend, it was to the point where juries found ordinary negligence
rather than gross negligence, therefore, concluding that maybe we
no longer had gross negligence in a strict sense of the term. They
would argue that gross negligence is something that you can phi-
losophize about, but as to a practical application on a case by
case basis, it is not strictly a meritorious defense. The language
of the supreme court in Johnson v. Hassett brings this to light
and merely states the fact that society no longer needed the guest
statute.
Our thoughts cannot be better stated than what Chief Justice
Hallwhols of the Wisconsin Supreme Court said in Bielski v.
Schultze.20 In that leading comparative negligence case, Wisconsin
overruled the guest statute and said:
The doctrine of gross negligence as a vehicle of social pol-
icy no longer fulfills a purpose in comparative negligence.
Much of what constituted gross negligence will be found to
constitute a higher percentage of ordinary negligence caus-
ing the harm. Obviously, we are stressing the basic goal of
the law of negligence, the equitable distribution of the loss
in relation to the respective contribution of the faults caus-
ing it.
D. Jury Verdicts
If we could assume in our supposed fact situation that A
might have been under the influence of alcoholic beverages or that
he was known to be a fast and reckless driver, then, of course,
we could assume that in the answers to B's complaint there would
be raised an affirmative defense of assumption of risk. It could
well be that the jury would assess negligence on B under the the-
ory of assumption of risk of fifteen to twenty percent, but as to
other types of negligence such as lookout, in a case such as this,
under the present North Dakota decisions, the imputation of negli-
gence of the driver to a passenger-owner, or just a passenger, is
often not the case.21 However, from experience in other jurisdictions
where comparative negligence has been the rule for some time,
the finders of fact are frequently finding small percentages of neg-
ligence which are passed on to the plaintiff and reduce his dam-
ages. This is consistent with the theory behind the whole doc-
20. Bielski v. Shultze, - Wis.- , 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
21. See Emery v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 407 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1969). Negligence of
driver not imputed to passenger decedent; Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1970).
Negligence of father-driver could not be imputed to mother and daughter to bar recovery
for their Injuries.
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trine. Under the former rule 'of contributory negligence the finding
of a small percent of contributory negligence was a complete bar
to this plaintiff. Now the jury precisely determines the respective
contributing negligence percentages and the end result is that the
plaintiff's damages are reduced accordingly.
When the case is submitted to a jury using the special verdict
procedure, under the new statute it is the jury's duty to:
1. Answer the question as to whether or not the parties in-
volved were negligent.
2. Then, if so, the question becomes whether or not such neg-
ligence was a direct or proximate cause of the claims pre-
sented.
3. Taking the combined negligence of those whose negligence
had a causal effect to be one hundred percent, break down
the one hundred percent, or attribute that portion of the one
hundred percent to the parties causally negligent.
4. Normally last, the amount of damages or award, undi-
minished by any calculation or reduction.
We placed damages as the jury's last question, but some pro-
ponents would say that damages should be the first question. Theo-
retically, at least, they would contend that you get a truer pic-
ture of damages because the jury at that point should have no
thoughts of mitigating or otherwise reducing the damages because
of its previous consideration of the negligence questions. The general
charge to the jury makes a positive direction that the damages ques-
tion be answered regardless of how they have answered the negli-
gence question. In a true special verdict type situation the court so
armed with the percentages of causal negligence determines the ver-
dict. Of course, if the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the de-
fendant's, then the plaintiff is nonsuited. If plaintiff's negligence is
less than fifty percent and the negligence of a defendant is greater,
then there is a finding for plaintiff, but plaintiff's damages are re-
duced by his percent of negligence.
It is to be noted that North Dakota permits the special ver-
dict and, 22 further, that the court has supervision over the verdicts
to set them aside if unconscionable or not justified by the evidence.23
Court supervision here is concerned with more than the pro-
priety of the damage award. It also entails a determination as to
whether the percent of negligence proration between the parties is
justified by the evidence. Courts consistently have ruled that the
breakdown of percentages in a given case is for the trier of fact,
22. N.D. R. Civ. P. 49(2).
23. N.D. R. Civ. P. 50(1).
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and on appeal, courts will not set aside what the jury has found
and substitute what they should have found by way of a given per-
centage proration.2 4 The appellate courts, rather, state that the per-
centages are not as found by the jury and order a new trial.
25
In actual practice, it is amazing how well the jury perceives
the end result of its participation in the comparative negligence
machinery. Real proof of that is shown in cases where there
are close negligence questions such as the plaintiff's contributory
negligence. When the jury wants to compensate, they return per-
centages of 45-55, 49-51 and similar combinations with the plain-
tiff's being the smaller percentage. Further, on occasion the jury
may find the answer to question number one (Was the defendant
negligent?) no, or carrying it a step further, may find defendant's
negligence fifty percent, or less than the plaintiff's. In either case,
the jury does not answer the damage question at all or they will
come back for further instructions; "Having found thusly, must we
spend time answering the damage question?" This again proves
that the composite makeup of juries results in an intelligent judg-
ment. The juries' inteliligence should never be underestimated.
To review some other portions of the statute as to its practical
application, we should note that the Minnesota statute when adopted
in 1969 was identical to the Wisconsin statute as it then existed.
North Dakota's statute is identical to the Minnesota statute, as far
as that statute went. However, North Dakota added the following
language:
Upon the request of any party this section shall be read by
the court to the jury and the attorneys representing the part-
ies may comment to the jury regarding this section.
In order to ascertain what this means, the question may be
asked, did North Dakota really want to copy the Minnesota law?
24. Bruno v. Biesecker, - Wisc.- , 162 N.W.2d 135, 138 (1968). "The general rule
is that a jury's findings to apportionment of negligence will be sustained if there is credible
evidence which under any reasonable view supports such findings. . . . apportionment of
negligence is peculiarly within the province of the jury to determine." See also, Martin v.
Bussert, - Minn.- , 193 N.W.2d 134, 139 (1971). "Upon a iieview of a jury's apportion-
ment of negligence between tort-feasors, we are governed by those same standards-that
is, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless there is evidence reason-
ably tending to sustain the apportionment or the apportionment is manifestly and palpably
against the weight of the evidence."
25. Winge v. Minnesota Transfer fy. Co., - Minn.- , 201 N.W.2d 259 (1972). In
this case the plaintiff, an automobile driver, drove into the side of the defendant's train
at a crossing. Apparently, this was a crossing on the road which the plaintiff was ac-
quainted with although for some reason did not see the train. The facts further revealed
that the operators of the train apparently noticed that the plaintiff had not observed the
crossing, and that they even attempted to stop the train for him. However, they failed and
the plaintiff did collide with about the second car of the train. In that case the court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant Railway Company and on appeal the Minnesota High
Court sustained the lower court's ruling by stating that, . . . . plaintiff's negligence vas
equal to, if not greater than, defendant's Is compelled by the record in view of the plain-
tiff's familiarity with the crossing, its unobstructed nature, the existence of arc lights, and
the condition of the road and weather." Id. at 264.
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By court rule, following adoption of its comparative negligence sta-
tute, and at about the time North Dakota adopted its statute, Min-
nesota amplified its law:
• . . the court shall inform the jury of the effect of its an-
swers to the percentage of negligence question and shall per-
mit counsel to comment thereon, unless the court is of the
opinion, that doubtful or unresolved questions of law, or com-
plex issues of law or fact are involved, which may render
such instruction or comment erroneous, misleading or confus-
ing to the jury.
2 -
This is where the Minnesota and North Dakota statutes differ
from Wisconsin. Wisconsin does not permit the attorney to argue the
effect of the findings of the percentages of negligence. Though Min-
nesota, by court rule, implies such permission, no case law has been
found which specifically deals with the question since the rule's adopt-
ion. If it does mean what it says it seems to be in conflict with
prior Minnesota case holdings.2 7 Our research reveals no North
Dakota case law which has spoken on the question of the right of
an attorney to argue the effect, or end result, of answering a spe-
cial interrogatory question one way or the other. We can assume
that such will be permitted under our North Dakota statutory lan-
guage.
It is well to spend a little time discussing possible comments
to the jury by attorneys as to percentages of negligence. We are
not aware that it has ever been a bar in the comparative negli-
gence law to argue what percentage of negligence or contributory
negligence a party may have in a given circumstance. Going back
to our hypothetical, it could be argued that A was guilty of sixty
percent negligence because of a composite of his negligent acts.
It could be argued that the composite of factors to C would make
him twenty-five percent negligent. What our statutory provision ap-
parently permits is for the attorney to argue the effect of those
percentages as relates to the plaintiff's right of recovery. It may
be easier to explain where you have only one plaintiff and one
defendant. Let us take A and B in a one-car roll-over. If we had
a serious question of assumption of risk, the parties could argue
that they were equally wrong because of some imputation of neg-
ligence or of joint venture, and then such argument could become
very significant. It may well be argued, in such a case, that if
the jury should conclude that A was fifty percent negligent, then it
will be sending this poor, badly-injured individual home without a
penny. On the other hand, the defense may well state that this is
26. Minnesota Rules of Court 49.01 subparagraph (2).
27. Johnson v. O'Brien, - Minn.- , 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960).
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nothing more than a wild adventure between the parties and that
the real way for the jury to do justice in this case is to find both
parties fifty percent negligent. The jury should therefore leave them
as they entered the courtroom and nobody should have recovery. It
is plain to see that this type of argument can be devastating and it,
in no uncertain terms, makes it very obvious to the jury what their
task is. Such type of argument is much disfavored by Heft, and




It would seem that our contribution statute as to sharing of
the loss is amended by adoption of the comparative negligence sta-
tute. Our contribution statute heretofore provided that the tortfea-
sors should share "pro rata.
'29
The comparative negligence statute provides:
When there are two or more persons who are jointly liable,
contributions to award shall be in proportion to the percent-
age of negligence attributable to each.30
The above should not be confused with the portion immediately
following the above quote:
• . . [p]rovided, however, that each shall remain jointly
and severally liable for the whole award.
3 1
This is really not different except as a matter of degree. If we
can use the example that plaintiff A receives an award of $10,000
and that no percentage of negligence is attributed to the plaintiff,
defendant B is found ninety-five percent negligent, and C a mere
five percent negligent. Let us assume that B is completely insolvent.
Plaintiff need not wait to collect his judgment. He can immediately
collect against the solvent defendant. If we have no question of sol-
vency, C would pay only $500; however, due to the insolvency of B,
C must pay the whole $10,000 as his negligence is greater than
plaintiff's. Of course, he has a right of contribution against B for
whatever that might be worth. This is not really a change be-
cause, before, there also was joint and several liability and B then
would be required to pay $5,000 under a sharing of negligence the-
28. C. HEYr & J. HFr, supra note 2.
29. N.D. CExT. CODE § 32-38-01(2) (1960).
"The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tort feasor who has
paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total re-
covery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share.
No tort feasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his pro rata share of
the entire liability."
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975). (Emphasis added).
31. Id.
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ory, before comparative negligence, and he would then, due to B's
insolvency, pay $10,000.
Let us take the above situation and merely find the plaintiff
A ten percent negligent, C five percent negligent and B eighty-five
percent negligent. You would have a situation where the plaintiff
A's negligence is greater than the solvent C. A then has his $10,000
judgment against the insolvent B.
Pleadings have not really changed because of the advent of com-
parative negligence. We still have our affirmative defenses and the
rules as to asserting them are the same.3 2 These defenses may be
argued in an attempt to show mitigation or a complete bar to re-
covery. It has been held that you can pool or combine the negli-
gence of parties who are in concert of action or joint venture to
make a percentage greater than the party seeking recovery.
33
As an example let us look at our fact situation. B commenced
an action against A and C. C counterclaims against B and cross-
claims against A for his injuries contending that they were not only
both negligent but at the time they were in a joint venture or that
their activities were in concert. The jury decides to leave them
all as they were and finds them all equally negligent-A - 331/,3 per-
cent, B - 331/3 percent and C - 331/3 percent. B could not recover as
his negligence is as great as the other defendants' and A and
C could not be in concert. The same is true of A. However, C
is able to combine the negligence of A and B to a total of 66 2/3
percent. C's negligence being 331/3 percent, he would recover; with
his damages being diminished by the 331/3 percent. Maybe, in this
specific case, the jury has been outsmarted.
It is important that we might consider indemnity and contribu-
tion pleading in the light of our assumed fact situation. Now let
us assume that both A and B commence a suit against C for per-
sonal injury. C now counterclaims against A and B for his injury
and against A for indemnification 'or contribution on the claims of
B. In all of these assumed fact situations we consider the jury's
findings to be that of causal negligence to the injuries complained
of. Now let us assume the jury finds: B ten percent negligent
and his damages to be $10,000; A's negligence forty-five percent
and C's negligence forty-five percent. B will recover $9,000. $4,500
to be paid by B and $4,500 by C, assuming both to be solvent.
32. N.D.R. Crv. P. 8(c).
33. Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., -Minn.-, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973).
Plaintiff here was a customer who fell over a door riser in a photo booth which was lo-
cated on property owned by one defendant, manufactured by a second defendant and In-
stalled by a third defendant. The jury found negligence on plaintiff to be thirty percent,
defendant owner thirty percent, defendant manufacturer thirty percent and installer ten
percent. The court found that defendants were jointly liable, but since one defendant
was less negligent than the plaintiff no recovery could be had against that one, and,
therefore, the two defendants equally shared seventy percent of plaintiff's damages.
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Through experience, guidelines have been developed to relate









Fail to Yield 70-30%
Improper Pass 75-25%
Wrong Side of Road 90-10%
Improper Turn 80-20%
These have been helpful, but of course each case must be reviewed
to see how close to normal and usual your case is.
The real goal of your representation of a plaintiff is to achieve
a result which finds plaintiff less negligent than a solvent defend-
ant, and, a step further, to keep plaintiff's negligence to a mini-
mum. Experience reveals that whereas formerly juries were reluc-
tant to find contributory negligence because that would be a bar
to any recovery, now juries, without much difficulty, find some
percentage of contributory negligence as long as it is less than
fifty percent. It is sometimes wise in a proper case to concede
that your plaintiff is negligent, for instance, as to lookout, but to
argue that such is minimal and even suggest to them a specific
minimal percentage. It is easier for the jury to see the real com-
parison or relationship between the parties. It must be remem-
bered the pooling of negligence that is possible.
III. SUMMARY
Comparative negligence and the accompanying special jury ver-
dict would seem to be a very convenient procedure, where, in
one trial, various third party proceedings, crossclaims, and counter-
claims can be disposed of. In the special verdict questions, with-
out reference to the nature of the pleadings, the jury is directed
to determine the negligence of each party, taking those contribut-
ing to the causal effect being 100 percent and prorating it. The
final solution of the problem is with the court. Though we have
only discussed the question of extent of damages in respect to
one person, of course, there can and will be many cases where-
in several parties' damages will be ascertained by the jury but,
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again, the actual applying of the respective conclusions of their
percentage findings of negligence to that damage is for the court.
We have been quite accustomed to severance and separate
trials of third party and other proceedings ancillary to the basic
action on the premise that such could be confusing to the jury.
Now the jury can take the case one question at a time and not
be concerned with the end result. Comparative negligence, then,
should lead to just results in multi-party actions. The jury com-
pares the negligence of one party to that of another party as re-
lates to the injured or damaged party.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have merely scratched the surface of the numerous as-
pects of comparative negligence. The law is new in North Dakota
and many practitioners are looking forward to their first encount-
ers with it. We intended to merely raise some points for their
consideration.
Now that North Dakota has comparative negligence, it is not too
early to consider how it can be improved. We have discussed the
anomaly of degrees of negligence. Even though the guest statute is
removed, there are still other degrees of negligence which permit
unequal or preferred treatment. If we are to be concerned about
consistent application of the doctrine, then we must also consider the
preferences given in landlord cases, cases involving trespassers,
licensees, or business invitees. Further, to be wholly consistent with
a complete comparison of negligence between parties, the vari-
ous governmental3 4 and charitable immunities available as a de-
fense seem illogical.
We think it is fair to conclude that we will see a continuting
number of states adopting comparative negligence and that we will
see removal of strict and rigid bars to recovery. Those states which
retain the defenses of charitable and governmental immunity as to
negligent acts will be required to insure against such potential lia-
bility or the immunities will be removed. These enactments reflect
social change. Society is now demanding that the route to recov-
ery for injured persons be smoothed out and that the resultant
losses be borne by those responsible on a more equitable basis, such
as where fault becomes a matter of degree.
84. Kitto v. Minot Pa k District, 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). Governmental immunity
was struck down in this case by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
